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COURT OF APPEALS, 1960 TERM
plaintiff challenged the validity of an amendment to the Emergency Housing
Rent Control Law.36 Plaintiff had purchased a rent-controlled apartment house
in Manhattan on February 20, 1961. Pursuant to statute,37 the plaintiff
tendered an application to the Rent Commission for the purpose of fixing higher
rents computed on the new valuation of the apartment house. Prior to the
Rent Commission's action on the application, the State Legislature passed the
amendment in controversy.38 The amendment states that a purchaser of a rent-
controlled apartment house cannot increase the rents based on the new purchase
price for one year from the date of purchase. This amendment was a modifi-
cation of the past law which permitted an owner of newly acquired property
to immediately increase his rents as provided by the former statute. Conse-
quently, plaintiff was deprived of one year's increase in rent which he would
have been able to receive prior to the enactment of the amendment. Plaintiff
argued that due process demands that a law be not unreasonable or arbitrary
and that it be reasonably related and applied to some actual and manifest
evil.89
The Court of Appeals shows by sufficient factual data that the legislature
has made a substantial investigation to warrant its legislation.4 0 The Court
further states that even if there were no record of the investigation, it may be
presumed that the Legislature has made sufficient inquiry into the matter.41
The purpose of rent control is to prevent undue rent increases and is,
therefore, beneficial to the public welfare. 42 Therefore, the constitutionality of
the amendment is upheld by the Court on the basis of the police power of the
State, which can be utilized to deter unwarranted and abnormal increases in
rents so as to protect public health, safety and general welfare. The strong
presumption in favor of the constitutionality of legislation coupled with the
strong police power of the State point to the soundness of the Court's opinion.
L. H. S.
STATUTORY RELIEF FOR TENANTS OF DESTROYED PREMISES RENDERED IN-
APPLICABLE BY PARTIES' CONTRARY AGREEMENT
At common law, absent an agreement to the contrary, destruction of a
building on land held under lease did not entitle the tenant to terminate his
36. N.Y. Unconsol. Laws § 8584(4) (a) (1) (v) (McKinney 1961).
37. N.Y. Unconsol. Laws, Rent and Eviction Regulations of the Temporary State
Housing Rent Commission § 33(5) (McKinney's Appendix 1961).
38. Supra note 36.
39. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934); Defiance Milk Products Co. v.
DuMond, 309 N.Y. 537, 132 N.E.2d 829 (1956); Matter of Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98 (1885).
40. See Rep. of the Comm. to Study Rents and Rental Conditions, Report on Rent
Control, N.Y. Laws 1961, p. 1971; Report of Spec. Comm. to Study the Sales Price Basis
and Evictions for New Housing under the Emergency Housing Rent Control Law, Report
on Rent Control, N.Y. Laws 1961, p. 1985.
41. Defiance Milk Products Co. v. DuMond, supra note 39; Lincoln Bldg. Associates
v. Barr, 1 N.Y.2d 413, 153 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1956).
42. New York University v. Temporary State Housing Rent Commission, 304 N.Y.
124, 106 N.E.2d 44 (1952).
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obligations under the lease or to recover any portion of rentals paid in advance,
even though such destruction deprived him of the benefits of the lease. 43 One
aspect of the injustice attendant upon application of this rule was remedied by
the enactment in 1860 of a statute which remained substantially unchanged until
1937.44 This statute, present Section 227 of the Real Property Law, recited that
where any leased building was destroyed by the elements, "and no express
agreement to the contrary had been made in writing," the tenant might, if the
destruction occurred without his fault, surrender possession and be relieved of
liability to pay rent subsequent to surrender. Since the statute mentioned no
right of apportionment of pre-paid rentals, the courts continued to apply the
common-law doctrine, which permitted the landlord to retain any and all rent
in his hands at the time the destruction occurred. 45 In 1937, however, the
Legislature amended Section 227 to mandate the apportionment of such rent.
40
In Grimmer v. Gallery,47 the question was what constituted an "express
agreement to the contrary" within the contemplation of Section 227. The
lease agreement, via a typewritten insertion in a printed form lease, provided
for a tenancy of one year, the rent payable fully in advance. Paragraph 5
of the lease contained a fire clause stipulating that either party might terminate
the lease in the event the premises were totally destroyed by fire, the tenant
to pay all rent to the date of said fire.
Subsequent to the execution of the lease, the tenant procured a "Leasehold
Interest B" fire policy, insuring his "leasehold interest," defined in the policy as
the insured's interest in the amount of advance rental paid in advance and
not recoverable under the terms of the lease.
After three months occupancy, the premises were destroyed by fire. On
the landlord's refusal to refund the unearned rental for the balance of the
term and the insurer's denial of liability under the fire policy, the tenant
instituted suit against both the landlord and the insurer, demanding judgment
against the one or the other. The Supreme Court granted plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment against the insurer but denied it as against the co-defendant
landlord. Appeal was taken by the insurer and the Appellate Division unani-
mously affirmed without opinion.48 The Court of Appeals reversed the entry
of summary judgment against the insurer and remanded for reargument on
plaintiff's motion against the landlord. The Court rejected the landlord's
argument that the recitation in paragraph 5, which provided that the tenant
shall pay all rent to the date of the fire rendered Section 227 of the Real
Property Law inapplicable. It reasoned that the provision was but "boiler
43. Butler v. Kidder, 87 N.Y. 98 (1881).
44. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1860, ch. 345, § 1; N.Y. Sess. Laws 1896, ch. 547, § 197.
45. Werner v. Padula, 49 App. Div. 135, 138, 63 N.Y. Supp. 68, 70 (Ist Dep't 1900).
46. Any rent paid in advance or which may have accrued by the terms of the
lease or any other hiring shall be adjusted to the date of such surrender. N.Y. Sess.
Laws 1937, ch. 100, § 227.
47. 8 N.Y.2d 369, 208 N.Y.S.2d 945 (1960).
48. 9 AMD.2d 718, 193 N.Y.S.2d 235 (4th Dep't 1959).
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plate" in a printed form lease, a provision meaningful only where rent is
payable periodically, and was rendered meaningless by the agreement that the
rent was payable fully in advance. Assuming arguendo that the provision was
relevant, the court concluded that far from evidencing a "contrary agreement,"
excluding the operation of Section 227, it reflects an agreement that, the
rental being paid fully in advance, the tenant is to pay only for the period of
actual possession and enjoyment and has a right to a refund of advance
payments.
The almost summary reversal of a unanimous Appellate Division on the
interpretation of a seemingly unambiguous statute can only be understood and
explained by viewing Section 227 in the light of its common law heritage. The
statute provides the tenant with two separate rights, termination of lease
obligations and apportionment of rental paid in advance. Conditioning both is
the proviso that "no express agreement to the contrary has been made in
writing." What is required to exclude the operation of the statute and deprive
the tenant of the benefits thereunder-an express agreement between the
parties concerning termination or one concerning apportionment? The issue is
crystallized by an examination of the opinion of the Supreme Court at Special
Term.49 The court reasoned that a tenant, paying rent in monthly installments,
would have no right to the refund of any unearned portion thereof on destruction
of the premises during that period. Therefore, the court concluded that there is
no basis for any distinction between recover? of advance payments of rent in a
lump sum and the advance payment of only an installment. The agreement that
rendered Section 227 inapplicable was the agreement giving either party the
right to terminate the lease. The inescapable conclusion is that any mention of
termination or apportionment by the parties will render Section 227 in-
applicable. A slightly modified position was reached in the cases of Seigel v.
Goldstein,50 and Coast Delicatessen Co., Inc. v. Cox's Bath Inc.51 In the former
case the court was confronted with a lease silent upon the question of apportion-
ment of prepaid rentals but providing that the landlord alone was entitled to
terminate on destruction of the premises. There the court denied the tenant's
right to an apportionment because the operation of Section 227 was excluded by
the contrary agreement of the parties with respect to termination.
A similar conclusion was reached in the Coast Delicatessen Case, the court
reasoning that:
The last sentence of the statute [providing for apportionment] ...
should not be read alone but the statute must be read as a whole, and
where the lease contains a clause completely providing for the rights
and obligations of the parties in the event of a fire, then, there being an
49. 7335 Cases & Points, Case 8, pp. 8-10.
50. 1 Misc. 2d 839, 148 N.Y.S.2d 266 (Miunic. Ct. 1955).
51. 175 Misc. 928, 24 N.Y.S.2d 893 (City Ct. 1941).
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"express agreement to the contrary," the statute is not control-
ling .... 51a
The lease in question is distinguishable from those in the above cases for
there is in fact no contrary agreement concerning the tenants right of
termination. But arguably, there is such an agreement concerning apportion-
ment; the lease provides that the tenant shall pay all rent to the date of the
fire, the statute rendering him liable for rent to the date of surrender.
It is submitted that the Court's holding is a liberalization of the rule
laid down in Seigel and Coast Delicatessen, a conscious progression away from
the strict common law rules of non-termination and apportionment, evidenced
in the opinion of the Supreme Court at Special Term, so as to fully effectuate
the sense and spirit of Section 227 of the Real Property Law.
The dissenting judge reasoned that since the tenant was denied summary
judgment against the landlord at Special Term and no appeal was taken, the
appeal was limited only as to the suit by the tenant and the insurance company
on the fire policy. Thus restricted, he argued that the policy had no meaning
whatever and covered no risk unless the insured and the insurer were in effect
agreeing that in the event of fire the insurance company would reimburse the
tenant for prepaid rent. Any other construction, it is said, would be manifestly
against common sense and justice, as it would allow the insurer to write a policy
and accept a premium without assuming any risk whatsoever.
It is submitted that the fact that the tenant applied for insurance, or that
the insurance company wrote the policy, does not necessarily mean that he, or
the insurer, construed the lease to deny the tenant the right to the return of any
advance rental. Had that been the construction put on the insurance contract
by the parties thereto, they would have simply defined the insured's "leasehold
interest" as "the amount of advance rental paid by the insured" without
adding-as they did----"and not recoverable under the term of the lease." Be that
as it may, it is likely that the tenant procured the insurance simply because he
was not sure what his rights were under the various contingencies which could
eventuate and wanted to provide against any and all of them.
R.D. G.
CONSTRUCTION OF A NOTICE or TERmiNATION IN A LEASE OF REAL PROPERTY
In Morlee Sales Corp. v. Manufacturers Trust Company,52 the Court of
Appeals was required to construe a "notice of termination" clause in a lease
of real estate to determine whether the purchaser of the property might
terminate the lease. Paragraph 18 of the lease provided:
That if the Landlord should sell said premises, prior to the expiration
of this lease and the purchaser thereof desires possession of said
premises, then and in that event, the Tenant will cancel this lease and
51a. Id. at 929, 24 N.Y.S.2d at 895.
52. 9 N.Y.2d 16, 210 N.Y.S.2d 516 (1961).
